On 12 October 2025, I, Daniel R. Azulay, prepared a sealed postal package addressed to the police in Utrecht, containing information concerning an alleged threat to national security. Before the package was dispatched, it came into the possession of the General Intelligence and Security Service (Algemene Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst, AIVD) via registered mail. The AIVD subsequently informed me that the contents of the package were “not relevant to national security”.

Nevertheless, a week after I had sent the package to the AIVD, I proceeded to send the an identical package with identical contents to the one sent to the AIVD, only lacking the letter to Kings Charles III & Willem Alexander, by registered mail to the postal address of the Utrecht police. On the front of the envelope was written “request for protection”.

The PostNL track&trace website and a subsequent inquiry with PostNL confirms that the package was registered in the postal system but was never delivered. Instead, it was intercepted and relabelled by a commercial forwarding service before disappearing entirely.

There exists an almost certain, evidence-based suspicion that the AIVD intercepted this postal item en route in order to prevent it from reaching the police. They are the only entity with the capability and the motive to do so.

A request under the Government Information (Public Access) Act (Wet open overheid, Woo) submitted on 4 November 2025 to the Ministry of Justice and Security should have provided clarity in this regard, but it was interfered with, which again points to the AIVD actively thwarting my attempts to achieve certainty about who intercepted my package to the police.

On the basis of the Intelligence and Security Services Act 2017 (Wet op de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten 2017, Wiv 2017), the interception of this specific postal item is assessed as unlawful for the following reasons:

• Absence of targeted deployment: I am a private individual with no criminal record, no known extremist ties, and a previously empty AIVD file. My action — sending information to the police — constitutes protected civic activity, not a threat. The AIVD’s own prior assessment that the information was “not relevant” expressly removes any legal basis for designating me, the sender, as a target for special powers.

• Breach of necessity and proportionality: The AIVD had already obtained and evaluated the information. A second interception of identical information yields no new intelligence, thereby lacking necessity. The serious infringement of my privacy as a citizen and of my right to communicate with law-enforcement authorities is wholly disproportionate to a security benefit that the AIVD itself has deemed zero.

• Undermining of the democratic rule of law: The interception effectively blocks a citizen’s report to the police. This act damages essential public trust in the rule of law and citizens’ ability to seek protection from and cooperate with their authorities. It is a direct contradiction of the AIVD’s mandate to protect the democratic legal order.

The AIVD’s course of action creates an irresolvable logical contradiction with serious implications:

• Premise 1: The AIVD publicly states that the information is not relevant to national security.
• Premise 2: The AIVD then carries out an action (postal interception) that is legally justifiable only if the information is relevant to a specific, concrete threat.

The only logical conclusion that resolves this contradiction is that the AIVD’s public statement is untrue. If the information is indeed irrelevant, their interception is illegal. If the interception (from their operational perspective) must be regarded as necessary, then the information is by definition highly relevant.

This leads to the following grave assessment:

The act of providing a citizen with a false written statement in order to mislead him on a matter of national security, with the intention of preventing him from cooperating with the police, may constitute the criminal offence of forgery in writing or a related offence of malfeasance in public office.

If the contents of the postal package are in fact relevant to a real threat to national security — as the interception itself implies — and the AIVD is actively concealing that relevance from the public and the police, a chilling possibility must be considered:

The threat described in the post may be an operation that is being directed by, or with the knowledge of, elements within the AIVD itself.

In this hypothetical scenario, the illegal interception would not serve to investigate a threat but to conceal it. The AIVD would then be using powers granted by the state to commit or facilitate the very threats it is supposed to prevent.

Violations of the Intelligence and Security Services Act 2017 (Wiv 2017):

1. Ordered List ItemArticle 26 Wiv 2017 – Unlawful exercise of a special power: Intercepting post without meeting the requirements of necessity, proportionality, and targeted deployment.
2. Article 8 Wiv 2017 – Breach of the duty of care: Acting carelessly and recklessly by misleading a citizen and infringing his fundamental rights without valid legal basis.

Offences under the Dutch Criminal Code (Wetboek van Strafrecht):

1. Article 225 – Forgery in writing: Drawing up or using a false written statement (the notification “not relevant”) to mislead a citizen.
2. Article 355 – Abuse of office: Intentionally and unlawfully making use of official powers by carrying out an illegal interception.
3. Article 272 – Breach of (official) secrecy: Intentionally and unlawfully disclosing or using (private) information obtained through an illegal interception.
4. Article 368 – Obstruction of the exercise of state institutions: Intentionally obstructing the police in the performance of its duties by intercepting communication intended for the police.

Violations of constitutional and international rights:

1. Article 10 of the Constitution – Infringement of the right to privacy: Unlawful interference with the constitutional right to respect for personal privacy and the secrecy of correspondence.
2. Article 8 European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) – Violation of the right to respect for private life: An unlawful and disproportionate interference with the right to respect for correspondence.
3. Article 5 of the Constitution – Right of petition: Undermining a citizen’s right to submit petitions to public authorities (the police).

The integrity of our rule of law and the safety of the public demand nothing less than a full and transparent investigation.