On 12 October 2025 I prepared a sealed, registered-mail package addressed to the Utrecht police containing detailed evidence of an alleged ongoing threat to national security—material identical to a package I had sent one week earlier to the AIVD. The AIVD promptly replied in writing that the contents were “not relevant to national security.” Undeterred, I dispatched the second package (minus only a courtesy letter to Kings Charles III and Willem-Alexander) clearly marked “request for protection” on the envelope. PostNL’s track-and-trace system confirmed acceptance, yet the item never reached the police: it was intercepted mid-transit, rerouted through an obscure commercial forwarding service, relabelled, and then vanished entirely.

The only entity with both the technical capability and the obvious motive to perform such a precise postal hijack is the AIVD itself. A Woo request submitted on 4 November 2025 to the Ministry of Justice and Security—intended to force disclosure of any interception order—was itself obstructed in ways that further implicating the service. Under the Wiv 2017 the interception is plainly unlawful: I am a private citizen with no criminal record and an officially empty prior file; the AIVD had already reviewed identical material and declared it irrelevant; and blocking a citizen’s protected report to the police violates necessity, proportionality, and the service’s own mandate to safeguard the democratic legal order.

This sequence produces an irreconcilable contradiction: if the information is truly irrelevant (as the AIVD’s written statement claims), then seizing the second package serves no lawful purpose and constitutes straightforward criminal abuse of power. If, however, the interception was operationally necessary, the written dismissal must be false—meaning the AIVD deliberately misled me in an official document to prevent police involvement. Either limb of the dilemma is grave: unlawful interception or deliberate forgery by a state intelligence agency.

The deeper implication is chilling. Should the material in fact describe a genuine national-security threat—as the very act of suppression strongly implies—then the AIVD’s behaviour shifts from mere obstruction to active concealment of that threat. In such a scenario the service would be deploying statutory powers not to neutralise danger but to shield it, potentially implicating elements within the agency in the threat itself.

Consequently, the incident gives rise to multiple criminal and constitutional violations including unlawful exercise of special powers (Art. 26 Wiv 2017), forgery in writing (Art. 225 Sr), abuse of office (Art. 355 Sr), obstruction of police duties (Art. 368 Sr), and breaches of Articles 8 and 10 of the Constitution and the ECHR. The AIVD’s own dismissal letter now functions as estoppel evidence: it will be appended to an immediate police report and, if necessary, to an Article 91 Sv objection and Article 226 Sv interim-relief petition to compel disclosure and secure judicial review. The rule-of-law demands nothing less than a full, transparent investigation.

On the basis of the Intelligence and Security Services Act 2017 (Wet op de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten 2017, Wiv 2017), the interception of this specific postal item is assessed as unlawful for the following reasons:

• Absence of targeted deployment: I am a private individual with no criminal record, no known extremist ties, and a previously empty AIVD file. My action — sending information to the police — constitutes protected civic activity, not a threat. The AIVD’s own prior assessment that the information was “not relevant” expressly removes any legal basis for designating me, the sender, as a target for special powers.

• Breach of necessity and proportionality: The AIVD had already obtained and evaluated the information. A second interception of identical information yields no new intelligence, thereby lacking necessity. The serious infringement of my privacy as a citizen and of my right to communicate with law-enforcement authorities is wholly disproportionate to a security benefit that the AIVD itself has deemed zero.

• Undermining of the democratic rule of law: The interception effectively blocks a citizen’s report to the police. This act damages essential public trust in the rule of law and citizens’ ability to seek protection from and cooperate with their authorities. It is a direct contradiction of the AIVD’s mandate to protect the democratic legal order.

The AIVD’s course of action creates an irresolvable logical contradiction with serious implications:

• Premise 1: The AIVD publicly states that the information is not relevant to national security.
• Premise 2: The AIVD then carries out an action (postal interception) that is legally justifiable only if the information is relevant to a specific, concrete threat.

The only logical conclusion that resolves this contradiction is that the AIVD’s public statement is untrue. If the information is indeed irrelevant, their interception is illegal. If the interception (from their operational perspective) must be regarded as necessary, then the information is by definition highly relevant.

This leads to the following grave assessment:

The act of providing a citizen with a false written statement in order to mislead him on a matter of national security, with the intention of preventing him from cooperating with the police, may constitute the criminal offence of forgery in writing or a related offence of malfeasance in public office.

If the contents of the postal package are in fact relevant to a real threat to national security — as the interception itself implies — and the AIVD is actively concealing that relevance from the public and the police, a chilling possibility must be considered:

The threat described in the post may be an operation that is being directed by, or with the knowledge of, elements within the AIVD itself.

In this hypothetical scenario, the illegal interception would not serve to investigate a threat but to conceal it. The AIVD would then be using powers granted by the state to commit or facilitate the very threats it is supposed to prevent.

Violations of the Intelligence and Security Services Act 2017 (Wiv 2017):

1. Ordered List ItemArticle 26 Wiv 2017 – Unlawful exercise of a special power: Intercepting post without meeting the requirements of necessity, proportionality, and targeted deployment.
2. Article 8 Wiv 2017 – Breach of the duty of care: Acting carelessly and recklessly by misleading a citizen and infringing his fundamental rights without valid legal basis.

1. Article 225 – Forgery in writing: Drawing up or using a false written statement (the notification “not relevant”) to mislead a citizen.
2. Article 355 – Abuse of office: Intentionally and unlawfully making use of official powers by carrying out an illegal interception.
3. Article 272 – Breach of (official) secrecy: Intentionally and unlawfully disclosing or using (private) information obtained through an illegal interception.
4. Article 368 – Obstruction of the exercise of state institutions: Intentionally obstructing the police in the performance of its duties by intercepting communication intended for the police.

1. Article 10 of the Constitution – Infringement of the right to privacy: Unlawful interference with the constitutional right to respect for personal privacy and the secrecy of correspondence.
2. Article 8 European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) – Violation of the right to respect for private life: An unlawful and disproportionate interference with the right to respect for correspondence.
3. Article 5 of the Constitution – Right of petition: Undermining a citizen’s right to submit petitions to public authorities (the police).

The integrity of our rule of law and the safety of the public demand nothing less than a full and transparent investigation.