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| cluster_14 [05/12/2025 22:57] – daniel | cluster_14 [11/12/2025 16:49] (current) – [Violations of constitutional and international rights] daniel |
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| ====== Unlawful interception by the AIVD of a parcel sent to the police containing research into neuroweapons ====== | ====== AIVD Package Hijack ====== |
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| On 12 October 2025, I, Daniel R. Azulay, prepared a sealed postal package addressed to the police in Utrecht, containing information concerning an alleged threat to national security. Before the package was dispatched, it came into the possession of the General Intelligence and Security Service (Algemene Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst, AIVD) via registered mail. The AIVD subsequently informed me that the contents of the package were “not relevant to national security”. | On 12 October 2025 I prepared a sealed, registered-mail package addressed to the Utrecht police containing detailed evidence of an alleged ongoing threat to national security—material identical to a package I had sent one week earlier to the AIVD. The AIVD promptly replied in writing that the contents were “not relevant to national security.” Undeterred, I dispatched the second package (minus only a courtesy letter to Kings Charles III and Willem-Alexander) clearly marked “request for protection” on the envelope. PostNL’s track-and-trace system confirmed acceptance, yet the item never reached the police: it was intercepted mid-transit, rerouted through an obscure commercial forwarding service, relabelled, and then vanished entirely. |
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| Nevertheless, a week later, I proceeded to send the a package with identical contents to the one sent to the AIVD by registered mail to the postal address of the Utrecht police. On the front of the envelope was written "request for protection". | {{ :img20251106185935.jpg |}} |
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| The PostNL track&trace website and a subsequent inquiry with PostNL confirms that the package was registered in the postal system but was never delivered. Instead, it was intercepted and relabelled by a commercial forwarding service before disappearing entirely. There exists an almost certain, evidence-based suspicion that the AIVD intercepted this postal item en route in order to prevent it from reaching the police. A request under the Government Information (Public Access) Act (Wet open overheid, Woo) submitted on 4 November 2025 to the Ministry of Justice and Security should provide clarity in this regard, [[cluster_20|but it was interfered with]]. | The only entity with both the technical capability and the obvious motive to perform such a precise postal hijack is the AIVD itself. A Woo request submitted on 4 November 2025 to the Ministry of Justice and Security—intended to force disclosure of any interception order—was itself obstructed in ways that further implicating the service. Under the Wiv 2017 the interception is plainly unlawful: I am a private citizen with no criminal record and an officially empty prior file; the AIVD had already reviewed identical material and declared it irrelevant; and blocking a citizen’s protected report to the police violates necessity, proportionality, and the service’s own mandate to safeguard the democratic legal order. |
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| | This sequence produces an irreconcilable contradiction: if the information is truly irrelevant (as the AIVD’s written statement claims), then seizing the second package serves no lawful purpose and constitutes straightforward criminal abuse of power. If, however, the interception was operationally necessary, the written dismissal must be false—meaning the AIVD deliberately misled me in an official document to prevent police involvement. Either limb of the dilemma is grave: unlawful interception or deliberate forgery by a state intelligence agency. |
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| | The deeper implication is chilling. Should the material in fact describe a genuine national-security threat—as the very act of suppression strongly implies—then the AIVD’s behaviour shifts from mere obstruction to active concealment of that threat. In such a scenario the service would be deploying statutory powers not to neutralise danger but to shield it, potentially implicating elements within the agency in the threat itself. |
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| | Consequently, the incident gives rise to multiple criminal and constitutional violations including unlawful exercise of special powers (Art. 26 Wiv 2017), forgery in writing (Art. 225 Sr), abuse of office (Art. 355 Sr), obstruction of police duties (Art. 368 Sr), and breaches of Articles 8 and 10 of the Constitution and the ECHR. The AIVD’s own dismissal letter now functions as estoppel evidence: it will be appended to an immediate police report and, if necessary, to an Article 91 Sv objection and Article 226 Sv interim-relief petition to compel disclosure and secure judicial review. The rule-of-law demands nothing less than a full, transparent investigation. |
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| ===== Legal analysis: Illegality of the interception ===== | ===== Legal analysis: Illegality of the interception ===== |
| - Article 8 Wiv 2017 – Breach of the duty of care: Acting carelessly and recklessly by misleading a citizen and infringing his fundamental rights without valid legal basis. | - Article 8 Wiv 2017 – Breach of the duty of care: Acting carelessly and recklessly by misleading a citizen and infringing his fundamental rights without valid legal basis. |
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| **Offences under the Dutch Criminal Code (Wetboek van Strafrecht):** | ==== Offences under the Dutch Criminal Code (Wetboek van Strafrecht) ==== |
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| - Article 225 – Forgery in writing: Drawing up or using a false written statement (the notification “not relevant”) to mislead a citizen. | - Article 225 – Forgery in writing: Drawing up or using a false written statement (the notification “not relevant”) to mislead a citizen. |
| - Article 368 – Obstruction of the exercise of state institutions: Intentionally obstructing the police in the performance of its duties by intercepting communication intended for the police. | - Article 368 – Obstruction of the exercise of state institutions: Intentionally obstructing the police in the performance of its duties by intercepting communication intended for the police. |
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| **Violations of constitutional and international rights:** | ==== Violations of constitutional and international rights ==== |
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| - Article 10 of the Constitution – Infringement of the right to privacy: Unlawful interference with the constitutional right to respect for personal privacy and the secrecy of correspondence. | - Article 10 of the Constitution – Infringement of the right to privacy: Unlawful interference with the constitutional right to respect for personal privacy and the secrecy of correspondence. |
| The integrity of our rule of law and the safety of the public demand nothing less than a full and transparent investigation. | The integrity of our rule of law and the safety of the public demand nothing less than a full and transparent investigation. |
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| ===== E-mail correspondence with PostNL ===== | ----- |
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