The Neuro Holocaust

The AI worst case scenario is happening and our governments are complicit

User Tools

Site Tools

You are here: The Neuro Holocaust » iPhone Spyware Confirmation
Trace: • ChatGPT Man-on-the-Side Attack 1 • iPhone Spyware Confirmation • ChatGPT Man-on-the-Side Attack 2 • Havana Syndrome • ICATOR is likely a counter-intelligence operation: exchange with Melanie V. (ICATOR) • VPN Exploited
cluster_7

Differences

This shows you the differences between two versions of the page.

Link to this comparison view

Both sides previous revisionPrevious revision
Next revision		Previous revision
cluster_7 [11/12/2025 16:49] – [Attachments (to be added)] danielcluster_7 [15/12/2025 16:51] (current) – [Likelihood of Malware and Reasoning] daniel
Line 40: Line 40:
 ==== Non-Delivered Signal Messages (New Screenshot) ==== ==== Non-Delivered Signal Messages (New Screenshot) ====
  
-  * Data: A screenshot compares my Signal chat with Viktor’s, showing messages I sent (e.g., from the gap context) present on my phone but absent on his, with no delivery receipts. +  * Data: A screenshot compares my Signal chat with <redacted>’s, showing messages I sent (e.g., from the gap context) present on my phone but absent on his, with no delivery receipts. 
-  * Analysis: Non-delivery, confirmed by Viktor, indicates interception or deletion before transmission. Pegasus’s capability to manipulate message queues supports this (Amnesty International, 2020).+  * Analysis: Non-delivery, confirmed by <redacted>, indicates interception or deletion before transmission. Pegasus’s capability to manipulate message queues supports this (Amnesty International, 2020).
   * Indicator: Strong evidence of pre-transmission tampering.   * Indicator: Strong evidence of pre-transmission tampering.
   * Forensic Analysis: iPhone 13 Compromise Date: October 27, 2025, 01:53 PM CET   * Forensic Analysis: iPhone 13 Compromise Date: October 27, 2025, 01:53 PM CET
Line 64: Line 64:
   * Indicator: Weak IOC, but supports initial access vector.   * Indicator: Weak IOC, but supports initial access vector.
  
 +==== Browser Compromise ====
 +
 +On my iPhone 13, a striking pattern emerged: with Safari and Firefox, it was impossible to download evidence files that I had uploaded myself, which points to a form of targeted suppression or manipulation of data traffic. Remarkably, this problem did not occur with a fresh installation of the Brave browser, which was able to download the files correctly. This inconsistency suggests that both Safari and Firefox on the device may have been compromised by Pegasus spyware, fitting within the broader pattern of interference characteristic of such infections.
 +
 +
 +
 +The observed cross-browser failures are statistically abnormal. Both Safari (Apple's default browser), Opera (a Chromium fork), and Firefox failed or produced misleading results when downloading the same file. These browsers use entirely independent engines and have no shared download stack, which practically rules out the chance of a coincidental simultaneous malfunction. Notably, file sizes were displayed incorrectly (265 MB versus 278.4 MB), and downloads were redirected via .html files—a classic pattern associated with redirect attacks or content interception.
 +
 +In contrast, a newly installed Brave browser was able to download the file correctly immediately—on the same device, with the same operating system, and on the same network. This direct contrasting experience is forensically relevant: it isolates the cause of the suppression to client-side mechanisms specific to the identified browser environments. Consider factors such as browser fingerprinting, cookie profiles, or App Store-related metadata that uniquely identify the device and its user. The behaviour suggests that certain browsers were deliberately recognised and manipulated, while new or unknown clients fell outside the detection profile.
 +
 +The anomalies in Firefox and Opera reinforce this conclusion. Firefox misled the user by presenting an incomplete or corrupt download and, in some cases, displaying incorrect file metadata—behaviour that contravenes the expected principles of a secure browser environment and indicates conditional request hijacking. Opera, which had also been freshly installed from the Apple App Store like Brave, nevertheless exhibited disruptions, while Brave worked flawlessly. Since both installations were fresh and clean, the distinction does not lie in reputation or browser code, but in the underlying installation metadata. This implies that the App Store download pipeline may serve as a vector for metadata tagging or targeted injection, tailored to factors such as Apple ID profiles, download timestamps, or device telemetry unique to the user's threat profile.
 ===== Likelihood of Malware and Reasoning ===== ===== Likelihood of Malware and Reasoning =====
  
Line 71: Line 82:
   - Permission Changes: Filesystem manipulation to block access, a defensive tactic (Amnesty International, 2020).   - Permission Changes: Filesystem manipulation to block access, a defensive tactic (Amnesty International, 2020).
   - iOS Exploitation: Zero-click vulnerabilities in iOS 17.5.1 (e.g., iMessage bugs) match their attack vectors.   - iOS Exploitation: Zero-click vulnerabilities in iOS 17.5.1 (e.g., iMessage bugs) match their attack vectors.
 +  - Browser Compromise: Cross-device browser-compromise prevented downloading of specific files, a tactic to interfere with my evidence.
   - Targeted Context: Device compromise and sabotaged communication with key contacts (<redacted>, colleague) suggest state-sponsored activity.   - Targeted Context: Device compromise and sabotaged communication with key contacts (<redacted>, colleague) suggest state-sponsored activity.
   * Infection Window: April 2023 (early signs) to June 2024 (last delays).   * Infection Window: April 2023 (early signs) to June 2024 (last delays).
/var/www/html/data/attic/cluster_7.1765471751.txt.gz · Last modified: by daniel

Page Tools

Donate Powered by PHP Valid HTML5 Valid CSS Driven by DokuWiki