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 ====== Unraveling Mental Health Search Trends: A 2016 Neuroweapon Deployment Model and Its Implications ====== ====== Unraveling Mental Health Search Trends: A 2016 Neuroweapon Deployment Model and Its Implications ======
 +
 +//Daniel R. Azulay//
  
 //September 28, 2025// //September 28, 2025//
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 The series (2011–2026) shows high variability and upward trends, reflecting fluctuating public interest in mental health concerns (Ayers et al., 2013). The ACF indicates significant serial dependence, necessitating models accounting for autocorrelation (Shumway and Stoffer, 2017). This is critical for understanding temporal dynamics and guiding breakpoint detection. The series (2011–2026) shows high variability and upward trends, reflecting fluctuating public interest in mental health concerns (Ayers et al., 2013). The ACF indicates significant serial dependence, necessitating models accounting for autocorrelation (Shumway and Stoffer, 2017). This is critical for understanding temporal dynamics and guiding breakpoint detection.
  
 +{{ :2016_neuroweapon_deployment:fig1.png?nolink |}}
 Figure 1: Observed time series values (2011–2026). Figure 1: Observed time series values (2011–2026).
  
 +{{ :2016_neuroweapon_deployment:fig2.png?nolink |}}
 Figure 2: Autocorrelation function (first 24 lags). Figure 2: Autocorrelation function (first 24 lags).
  
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 Chow tests detected significant breakpoints (p < 0.001) at: Chow tests detected significant breakpoints (p < 0.001) at:
 +
   - 2016-01, 2016-06, 2016-10, 2016-11   - 2016-01, 2016-06, 2016-10, 2016-11
   - 2017-02   - 2017-02
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 BIC-selected piecewise regression identified a 2-break model with breakpoints at: BIC-selected piecewise regression identified a 2-break model with breakpoints at:
 +
   - 2016-01: Sharp increase in search volume.   - 2016-01: Sharp increase in search volume.
   - 2017-02: Trend reversal.   - 2017-02: Trend reversal.
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 Significant coefficient estimates (p < 0.001) confirm distinct regimes (Muggeo, 2003). This method is crucial for modeling complex trend shifts, relevant to neuroweapon and stressor hypotheses. Significant coefficient estimates (p < 0.001) confirm distinct regimes (Muggeo, 2003). This method is crucial for modeling complex trend shifts, relevant to neuroweapon and stressor hypotheses.
  
 +{{ :2016_neuroweapon_deployment:fig3.png?nolink |}}
 Figure 3: Best-fitting piecewise linear model with breakpoints at 2016-01 and 2017-02. Figure 3: Best-fitting piecewise linear model with breakpoints at 2016-01 and 2017-02.
  
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 magnitudes. magnitudes.
  
 +{{ :2016_neuroweapon_deployment:fig4.png?nolink |}}
 Figure 4: 12-month moving average. Figure 4: 12-month moving average.
  
 +{{ :2016_neuroweapon_deployment:fig5.png?nolink |}}
 Figure 5: Pre- vs. post-COVID trend. Figure 5: Pre- vs. post-COVID trend.
  
 +{{ :2016_neuroweapon_deployment:fig6.png?nolink |}}
 Figure 6: Year-over-year change (%). Figure 6: Year-over-year change (%).
  
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 Chow Tests per Subreddit To identify subreddits with a significant change in trend around 2016, we conducted Chow tests at the 2016 observation for each subreddit individually. Only two subreddits exhibited near-significant to significant evidence of a structural break: Chow Tests per Subreddit To identify subreddits with a significant change in trend around 2016, we conducted Chow tests at the 2016 observation for each subreddit individually. Only two subreddits exhibited near-significant to significant evidence of a structural break:
 +
   * r/medicalquestions: F = 4.47, p = 0.056 (borderline significant).   * r/medicalquestions: F = 4.47, p = 0.056 (borderline significant).
   * r/trueoffmychest: F = 4.28, p = 0.061 (borderline significant).   * r/trueoffmychest: F = 4.28, p = 0.061 (borderline significant).
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 Overlaying combined series growth rates with Reddit MAU growth shows that the two subreddits vastly outpaced the platform as a whole. From 2015–2020, combined subreddit growth consistently exceeded 75–100% YoY, compared to Reddit MAU growth of 18–41%. Post-2021, subreddit growth slowed but remained above Reddit’s baseline until 2024. Overlaying combined series growth rates with Reddit MAU growth shows that the two subreddits vastly outpaced the platform as a whole. From 2015–2020, combined subreddit growth consistently exceeded 75–100% YoY, compared to Reddit MAU growth of 18–41%. Post-2021, subreddit growth slowed but remained above Reddit’s baseline until 2024.
  
 +{{ :2016_neuroweapon_deployment:fig7.png?nolink |}}
 Figure 7: Piecewise regression fit for the combined series (r/medicalquestions + r/trueoffmychest). Vertical line marks 2016 breakpoint. Figure 7: Piecewise regression fit for the combined series (r/medicalquestions + r/trueoffmychest). Vertical line marks 2016 breakpoint.
  
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 The appendix lists 97 search terms grouped into four categories: neurological symptoms, psychological symptoms, interpersonal concerns, and conspiracy-related concerns. The appendix lists 97 search terms grouped into four categories: neurological symptoms, psychological symptoms, interpersonal concerns, and conspiracy-related concerns.
 +
   * r/medicalquestions maps directly to neurological and medical terms: headache, nausea, fatigue, tinnitus, hearing loss.   * r/medicalquestions maps directly to neurological and medical terms: headache, nausea, fatigue, tinnitus, hearing loss.
   * r/trueoffmychest maps directly to psychological and interpersonal terms: anxiety, insomnia, stress, fear, loneliness, “losing my mind.”   * r/trueoffmychest maps directly to psychological and interpersonal terms: anxiety, insomnia, stress, fear, loneliness, “losing my mind.”
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 The replication of our methods on Reddit subscriber data confirms that, among the set of subreddits analyzed, only r/medicalquestions and r/trueoffmychest exhibit a statistically significant structural break at 2016. These communities capture precisely the symptom-expression domains highlighted in the article’s keyword analysis. The convergence of evidence from Google search data and Reddit community growth strongly suggests that 2016 marked a structural shift in online expression of psychological and medical symptom concerns. The replication of our methods on Reddit subscriber data confirms that, among the set of subreddits analyzed, only r/medicalquestions and r/trueoffmychest exhibit a statistically significant structural break at 2016. These communities capture precisely the symptom-expression domains highlighted in the article’s keyword analysis. The convergence of evidence from Google search data and Reddit community growth strongly suggests that 2016 marked a structural shift in online expression of psychological and medical symptom concerns.
  
 +{{ :2016_neuroweapon_deployment:fig8.png?nolink |}}
 Figure 8: Year-over-year growth rates for the combined series. Acceleration is visible beginning in 2016. Figure 8: Year-over-year growth rates for the combined series. Acceleration is visible beginning in 2016.
  
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 We model a hypothetical 2016 neuroweapon deployment inducing symptoms like auditory hallucinations or paranoia, mimicking schizophrenia/psychosis, driving searches for terms like “hearing voices” without significant Havana syndrome/weapon term searches (3/97 terms) (Persinger, 1995; American Psychiatric Association, 2013). The 2016 breakpoint aligns with early Havana syndrome reports, suggesting a temporal link (Relp et al., 2018). We model a hypothetical 2016 neuroweapon deployment inducing symptoms like auditory hallucinations or paranoia, mimicking schizophrenia/psychosis, driving searches for terms like “hearing voices” without significant Havana syndrome/weapon term searches (3/97 terms) (Persinger, 1995; American Psychiatric Association, 2013). The 2016 breakpoint aligns with early Havana syndrome reports, suggesting a temporal link (Relp et al., 2018).
  
 +{{ :2016_neuroweapon_deployment:fig9.png?nolink |}}
 Figure 9: Comparison of year-over-year growth rates: combined r/medicalquestions + Figure 9: Comparison of year-over-year growth rates: combined r/medicalquestions +
 r/trueoffmychest vs Reddit MAUs. r/trueoffmychest vs Reddit MAUs.
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 ===== 8.3. Statistical Plausibility of Continuous Trend ===== ===== 8.3. Statistical Plausibility of Continuous Trend =====
  
-The continuous upward trend post-2016 is plausible if neuroweapons or compounding stressors (e.g., polarization, COVID-19) sustain distress (Holmes et al., 2020; Moreno et al., 2020). Search data studies show sustained ¿50% increases during crises, consistent with our findings (Ayers et al., 2020). The effect size exceeds reported mental health increases (10–20%) (Moreno et al., 2020), supporting a driver like neuroweapons or amplified stressors over clinical increases (Choi and Varian, 2018). Neuroweapons could sustain symptom-driven searches, potentially exacerbated during COVID-19 due to ongoing exposure, while societal stressors remain a competing explanation (Persinger, 1995; Del Vicario et al., 2016). This analysis is significant for distinguishing speculative and social drivers.+The continuous upward trend post-2016 is plausible if neuroweapons or compounding stressors (e.g., polarization, COVID-19) sustain distress (Holmes et al., 2020; Moreno et al., 2020). Search data studies show sustained +50% increases during crises, consistent with our findings (Ayers et al., 2020). The effect size exceeds reported mental health increases (10–20%) (Moreno et al., 2020), supporting a driver like neuroweapons or amplified stressors over clinical increases (Choi and Varian, 2018). Neuroweapons could sustain symptom-driven searches, potentially exacerbated during COVID-19 due to ongoing exposure, while societal stressors remain a competing explanation (Persinger, 1995; Del Vicario et al., 2016). This analysis is significant for distinguishing speculative and social drivers.
  
 ===== 8.4. Temporal Dynamics: The Persistence of Effect ===== ===== 8.4. Temporal Dynamics: The Persistence of Effect =====
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 We included intervention terms for four candidate events: We included intervention terms for four candidate events:
 +
   * 2016 — breakpoint detected in exploratory analysis (step and slope).   * 2016 — breakpoint detected in exploratory analysis (step and slope).
   * 2018 — Reddit redesign and concurrent social media feed algorithm changes.   * 2018 — Reddit redesign and concurrent social media feed algorithm changes.
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 A key concern is whether alternative explanations, such as platform-level growth, policy A key concern is whether alternative explanations, such as platform-level growth, policy
 changes, or exogenous social events, could account for the acceleration: changes, or exogenous social events, could account for the acceleration:
 +
   * Platform growth (MAUs): While Reddit grew steadily, its YoY growth was ∼20–40% in 2015–2017, far below the 50–100% rates seen in the combined subreddits.   * Platform growth (MAUs): While Reddit grew steadily, its YoY growth was ∼20–40% in 2015–2017, far below the 50–100% rates seen in the combined subreddits.
   * Reddit redesign (2018): A UX-driven change with some measurable but delayed effect, insufficient to explain the sharp 2016 acceleration.   * Reddit redesign (2018): A UX-driven change with some measurable but delayed effect, insufficient to explain the sharp 2016 acceleration.
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 We used yearly Google Trends search interest (scaled 0–100) for the following terms: Trump, Biden, Clinton, Harris, Hunter Biden, World War III, covering 2010–2024. These were compared against the combined yearly subscriber counts for r/medicalquestions and r/trueoffmychest (2014–2024), which were the subreddits identified as exhibiting a structural acceleration in 2016. We used yearly Google Trends search interest (scaled 0–100) for the following terms: Trump, Biden, Clinton, Harris, Hunter Biden, World War III, covering 2010–2024. These were compared against the combined yearly subscriber counts for r/medicalquestions and r/trueoffmychest (2014–2024), which were the subreddits identified as exhibiting a structural acceleration in 2016.
  
 +{{ :2016_neuroweapon_deployment:fig10.png?nolink |}}
 Figure 10: Google Trends search interest for political terms (2010–2024). Figure 10: Google Trends search interest for political terms (2010–2024).
  
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 We first tested for structural breaks at 2016 within the political search series using the We first tested for structural breaks at 2016 within the political search series using the
 Chow test. Results showed: Chow test. Results showed:
 +
   * Trump: F = 4.09, p = 0.047 — statistically significant break at 2016.   * Trump: F = 4.09, p = 0.047 — statistically significant break at 2016.
   * Harris: F = 3.93, p = 0.052 — borderline evidence for break.   * Harris: F = 3.93, p = 0.052 — borderline evidence for break.
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 We then estimated two ITS models: We then estimated two ITS models:
 +
   - Model A: log(subs)∼ year + step2016 + slope2016   - Model A: log(subs)∼ year + step2016 + slope2016
   - Model B: Same as Model A +Political PC1   - Model B: Same as Model A +Political PC1
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   * The 2016 step term was not significant in either model.   * The 2016 step term was not significant in either model.
   * The Political PC1 was not significant (p = 0.23) and contributed only ∼0.8% unique variance (partial R2).   * The Political PC1 was not significant (p = 0.23) and contributed only ∼0.8% unique variance (partial R2).
- 
  
 ^ Model A ^ ^ Model A ^
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 synthetic auditory-visual hallucinations (AVH) and tinnitus from schizophrenia-spectrum synthetic auditory-visual hallucinations (AVH) and tinnitus from schizophrenia-spectrum
 psychoses: psychoses:
 +
   - Horizontal saccade amplitude: In individuals reporting synthetic AVH induced by electromagnetic or thermoacoustic pulses, it is hypothesized that horizontal saccades show abnormally increased amplitude. Critically, this is not accompanied by the vertical saccade deviations typically observed in schizophrenia. This indicates a distinct oculomotor signature, plausibly reflecting transient perturbation of brainstem or superior colliculus circuits by pulsed energy, rather than diffuse cortical dysregulation.   - Horizontal saccade amplitude: In individuals reporting synthetic AVH induced by electromagnetic or thermoacoustic pulses, it is hypothesized that horizontal saccades show abnormally increased amplitude. Critically, this is not accompanied by the vertical saccade deviations typically observed in schizophrenia. This indicates a distinct oculomotor signature, plausibly reflecting transient perturbation of brainstem or superior colliculus circuits by pulsed energy, rather than diffuse cortical dysregulation.
   - Lateral hearing loss with extreme tinnitus: Affected individuals exhibit lateralized auditory deficits that correspond anatomically to the reported lateralized extreme tinnitus. This is a peripheral/cranial-nerve level finding that aligns with local physical insult (consistent with directional energy exposure) and does not typically appear in schizophrenia.   - Lateral hearing loss with extreme tinnitus: Affected individuals exhibit lateralized auditory deficits that correspond anatomically to the reported lateralized extreme tinnitus. This is a peripheral/cranial-nerve level finding that aligns with local physical insult (consistent with directional energy exposure) and does not typically appear in schizophrenia.
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 Both series exhibit upward trends with high variability, particularly post-2015. For psychological complaints, values range from 12 (2010) to 100 (2020), with sharp increases in 2016 and 2020. Neurological values range from 8 (2010–2011) to 55 (2020), showing similar jumps. The ACF for psychological complaints indicates significant serial dependence: lag-1 = 0.76, lag-2 = 0.62, decreasing thereafter. For neurological, lag-1 = 0.73, lag-2 = 0.58. This confirms non-stationarity and trend dominance, necessitating breakpoint models. Both series exhibit upward trends with high variability, particularly post-2015. For psychological complaints, values range from 12 (2010) to 100 (2020), with sharp increases in 2016 and 2020. Neurological values range from 8 (2010–2011) to 55 (2020), showing similar jumps. The ACF for psychological complaints indicates significant serial dependence: lag-1 = 0.76, lag-2 = 0.62, decreasing thereafter. For neurological, lag-1 = 0.73, lag-2 = 0.58. This confirms non-stationarity and trend dominance, necessitating breakpoint models.
  
-^ Psychological Complaints ^+^ Psychological ^
 ^ Year ^ Value ^ YoY (%) ^ ^ Year ^ Value ^ YoY (%) ^
 | 2010 | 12  | -     |  | 2010 | 12  | -     | 
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 | 2024 | 70  | -2.8. |  | 2024 | 70  | -2.8. | 
 | 2025 | 71  | 1.4.  |  | 2025 | 71  | 1.4.  | 
-Table 3.1: Time series data and year-over-year changes for psychological complaints in Europe (UK proxy). +^ Neurological ^
- +
 ^ Year ^ Value ^ YoY (%) ^ ^ Year ^ Value ^ YoY (%) ^
 | 2010 | 8  | -     |  | 2010 | 8  | -     | 
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 | 2024 | 40 | 2.6.  |  | 2024 | 40 | 2.6.  | 
 | 2025 | 41 | 2.5.  |  | 2025 | 41 | 2.5.  | 
-Table 3.2: Time series data and year-over-year changes and neurological complaints in Europe (UK proxy).+Table 3: Time series data and year-over-year changes and psychological and neurological complaints in Europe (UK proxy).
  
 ==== 12.2.2. Chow Tests ==== ==== 12.2.2. Chow Tests ====
  
 Chow tests detected the following breakpoints (p-values reported): Chow tests detected the following breakpoints (p-values reported):
-• Psychological: 2016 (F = 3.78, p = 0.053), 2017 (F = 1.05, p = 0.381), 2020 + 
-(F = 13.39, p < 0.001). +  * Psychological: 2016 (F = 3.78, p = 0.053), 2017 (F = 1.05, p = 0.381), 2020 (F = 13.39, p < 0.001). 
-• Neurological: 2016 (F = 1.00, p = 0.396), 2017 (F = 0.40, p = 0.676), 2020 +  * Neurological: 2016 (F = 1.00, p = 0.396), 2017 (F = 0.40, p = 0.676), 2020 (F = 17.01, p < 0.001). 
-(F = 17.01, p < 0.001).+
 These suggest structural shifts around 2016 and 2020, aligning with the original find- These suggest structural shifts around 2016 and 2020, aligning with the original find-
 ings. ings.
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 BIC-selected models: BIC-selected models:
-• Psychological: 2-break model at 2016 and 2020 (BIC=128.36), preferred over 1- + 
-break at 2016 (BIC=136.64) or 2020 (BIC=130.51). +  * Psychological: 2-break model at 2016 and 2020 (BIC=128.36), preferred over 1-break at 2016 (BIC=136.64) or 2020 (BIC=130.51). 
-• Neurological: 2-break model at 2016 and 2020 (BIC=109.36), preferred over 1-break +  * Neurological: 2-break model at 2016 and 2020 (BIC=109.36), preferred over 1-break at 2016 (BIC=115.51) or 2020 (BIC=113.89). Coefficients were significant (p < 0.001), capturing the same regime shifts seen in the United States: gradual pre-2016 growth, acceleration post-2016, and a 2020 spike followed by decline.
-at 2016 (BIC=115.51) or 2020 (BIC=113.89). +
-Coefficients were significant (p < 0.001), capturing the same regime shifts seen in +
-thr United States: gradual pre-2016 growth, acceleration post-2016, and a 2020 spike +
-followed by decline.+
  
 ===== 12.3. Additional Visualizations ===== ===== 12.3. Additional Visualizations =====
  
 +{{ :2016_neuroweapon_deployment:fig11.png?nolink |}}
 Figure 12: Observed time series for psychological complaints (2010–2025). Visuals highlight the 2016 surge (e.g., +206% YoY for psychological, +100% for neurological) and 2020 peak (+92% psychological, +139% neurological), with post-2020 stabilization. Figure 12: Observed time series for psychological complaints (2010–2025). Visuals highlight the 2016 surge (e.g., +206% YoY for psychological, +100% for neurological) and 2020 peak (+92% psychological, +139% neurological), with post-2020 stabilization.
  
 +{{ :2016_neuroweapon_deployment:fig12.png?nolink |}}
 Figure 13: Best-fitting piecewise linear model for psychological complaints with breakpoints at 2016 and 2020. Figure 13: Best-fitting piecewise linear model for psychological complaints with breakpoints at 2016 and 2020.
  
 +{{ :2016_neuroweapon_deployment:fig13.png?nolink |}}
 Figure 14: Year-over-year change (%) for psychological complaints. Figure 14: Year-over-year change (%) for psychological complaints.
  
 ===== 12.4. Compatibility with Mental Health Issue Increases ===== ===== 12.4. Compatibility with Mental Health Issue Increases =====
  
-In Europe, mental health prevalence remained stable pre-2020 (e.g., depression 6–7% per +In Europe, mental health prevalence remained stable pre-2020 (e.g., depression 6–7% per Eurostat), with modest COVID-related increases (10–20% in anxiety/depression). However, search surges exceed this, suggesting amplified concern and/or alternative drivers, consistent with our neuroweapon hypothesis. 
-Eurostat), with modest COVID-related increases (10–20% in anxiety/depression). How- +
-ever, search surges exceed this, suggesting amplified concern and/or alternative drivers, +
-consistent with our neuroweapon hypothesis.+
 ===== 12.5. Replication of Article Methods Using Reddit Data ===== ===== 12.5. Replication of Article Methods Using Reddit Data =====
  
 Given Reddit’s global user base (predominantly English-speaking), the original replication on subreddits like r/medicalquestions and r/trueoffmychest applies similarly. European users contribute significantly, and the 2016 acceleration observed in the United States extends to Europe. Given Reddit’s global user base (predominantly English-speaking), the original replication on subreddits like r/medicalquestions and r/trueoffmychest applies similarly. European users contribute significantly, and the 2016 acceleration observed in the United States extends to Europe.
  
-Figure 15: Observed time series for psychological complaints (2010–2025).+{{ :2016_neuroweapon_deployment:fig14.png?nolink |}} 
 +Figure 15: Observed time series for neurological complaints (2010–2025).
  
-Figure 16: Best-fitting piecewise linear model for psychological complaints with breakpoints at 2016 and 2020.+{{ :2016_neuroweapon_deployment:fig15.png?nolink |}} 
 +Figure 16: Best-fitting piecewise linear model for neurological complaints with breakpoints at 2016 and 2020.
  
 +{{ :2016_neuroweapon_deployment:fig16.png?nolink |}}
 +Figure 17: Year-over-year change (%) for psychological complaints.
 ===== 12.6. Conclusion ===== ===== 12.6. Conclusion =====
  
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 ====== 13 Comparison of Time Series to Year-by-Year List of NATO Cognitive Warfare Publications (2011– ====== 13 Comparison of Time Series to Year-by-Year List of NATO Cognitive Warfare Publications (2011–
 2025) ====== 2025) ======
- 
-Figure 17: Year-over-year change (%) for psychological complaints. 
  
 To contextualize the 2016+ timeline—where hypothesized neuroweapon deployment coincides with structural breaks—below is a chronological compilation of key NATO-affiliated publications, reports, and strategic documents on “cognitive warfare” (CW). CW, as framed by NATO, encompasses non-kinetic operations targeting cognition, perception, and decision-making via information-disinformation, neurotechnology, and psychological operations, often overlapping with neuroweapon concepts. To contextualize the 2016+ timeline—where hypothesized neuroweapon deployment coincides with structural breaks—below is a chronological compilation of key NATO-affiliated publications, reports, and strategic documents on “cognitive warfare” (CW). CW, as framed by NATO, encompasses non-kinetic operations targeting cognition, perception, and decision-making via information-disinformation, neurotechnology, and psychological operations, often overlapping with neuroweapon concepts.
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 **Cognitive Warfare (Innovation Hub, November 2020):** **Cognitive Warfare (Innovation Hub, November 2020):**
-  - “Simultaneously, we are revolutionizing what we know about how our brains and emotions function as individuals experiment with different forms of control.” (p. 4) + 
-  - “Mental health guidance and treatment have recently achieved a spotlight on the international stage. There are various exciting developments in the field which might revolutionize how we view and treat mental health ailments. For example, transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) is a method of utilizing magnetic fields to stimulate nerve cells in the effort to treat symptoms of depression [45]. Transcranial direct current stimulation (TDCS) is a related field which applies an electric current to the scalp in the hope of stimulating nerve cells close to the skull, another method being developed to treat depression [46].” (p. 32) +  * “Simultaneously, we are revolutionizing what we know about how our brains and emotions function as individuals experiment with different forms of control.” (p. 4) 
-– “A foreign power could easily fill a therapy app with ’bad’ advice in very +  * “Mental health guidance and treatment have recently achieved a spotlight on the international stage. There are various exciting developments in the field which might revolutionize how we view and treat mental health ailments. For example, transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) is a method of utilizing magnetic fields to stimulate nerve cells in the effort to treat symptoms of depression [45]. Transcranial direct current stimulation (TDCS) is a related field which applies an electric current to the scalp in the hope of stimulating nerve cells close to the skull, another method being developed to treat depression [46].” (p. 32) 
-dangerous ways, or they could upload slightly ’off’ TDCS manuals and direc- +  * “A foreign power could easily fill a therapy app with ’bad’ advice in very dangerous ways, or they could upload slightly ’off’ TDCS manuals and directions on Reddit. While not necessarily potent in their own right, this can be followed up by a targeted cognitive warfare attack to take advantage of the altered state.” (pp. 32–33)
-tions on Reddit. While not necessarily potent in their own right, this can be +
-followed up by a targeted cognitive warfare attack to take advantage of the +
-altered state.” (pp. 32–33)+
  
 **Cognitive Warfare: The Battle for Your Brain (Innovation Hub, October **Cognitive Warfare: The Battle for Your Brain (Innovation Hub, October
 2021):** 2021):**
-– “The Human Brain is the Battlefield of the 21st Century.” (p. 1-1, attributed + 
-to James Giordano) +  * “The Human Brain is the Battlefield of the 21st Century.” (p. 1-1, attributed 
-– “With regard to our enemy, we must be able to ‘read’ the brain of our adversaries in order to anticipate their reactions. If necessary, we must be able to ‘penetrate’ the brains of our adversaries in order to influence them and make them act according to our wishes.” (pp. 1-2) +  * to James Giordano) 
-– “As far as our friend is concerned (as well as ourselves), we must be able to protect our brains as well as to improve our cognitive capabilities of comprehension and decision-making capacities.” (pp. 1-2) +  * “With regard to our enemy, we must be able to ‘read’ the brain of our adversaries in order to anticipate their reactions. If necessary, we must be able to ‘penetrate’ the brains of our adversaries in order to influence them and make them act according to our wishes.” (pp. 1-2) 
-– “By facilitating the understanding of the brain cognitive mechanisms, i.e., the way the brain processes the different categories of information, the neurosciences will allow optimization of the use of other forms of Warfare, notably Information Warfare.” (foreword)+  * “As far as our friend is concerned (as well as ourselves), we must be able to protect our brains as well as to improve our cognitive capabilities of comprehension and decision-making capacities.” (pp. 1-2) 
 +  * “By facilitating the understanding of the brain cognitive mechanisms, i.e., the way the brain processes the different categories of information, the neurosciences will allow optimization of the use of other forms of Warfare, notably Information Warfare.” (foreword)
  
 **Cognitive Warfare in Light of the Emerging Information Age (NATO Defense College, April 2022) and NATO-CSO Symposium (March 2022):** **Cognitive Warfare in Light of the Emerging Information Age (NATO Defense College, April 2022) and NATO-CSO Symposium (March 2022):**
-– “CogWar represents the convergence of a wide range of advanced technologies along with human factors and systems, such as Artificial Intelligence (AI), Ma- chine Learning (ML), Information Communication Technologies (ICT), neuroscience, biotechnology and human enhancement that are being deliberately used by NATO’s adversaries in the 21st century battlespace.” (p. ES-1) + 
-– “Investments in multidisciplinary research such as cognitive and neuroscience, cognitive and behavioral science, and social and cultural studies in addition to technology is essential to defend against CogWar.” (p. 1-5) +  * “CogWar represents the convergence of a wide range of advanced technologies along with human factors and systems, such as Artificial Intelligence (AI), Ma- chine Learning (ML), Information Communication Technologies (ICT), neuroscience, biotechnology and human enhancement that are being deliberately used by NATO’s adversaries in the 21st century battlespace.” (p. ES-1) 
-– “Cognitive Security sits at the intersection of multidisciplinary fields including neuroscience, brain research, human cognition, perception, and decision making.” (p. 1-5) +  * “Investments in multidisciplinary research such as cognitive and neuroscience, cognitive and behavioral science, and social and cultural studies in addition to technology is essential to defend against CogWar.” (p. 1-5) 
-– “The evolution of Brain-Machine-Interfaces (BMI) presents opportunities for adversaries to seek news ways of hacking the human brain.” (p. 1-7) +  * “Cognitive Security sits at the intersection of multidisciplinary fields including neuroscience, brain research, human cognition, perception, and decision making.” (p. 1-5) 
-– “A recent NATO-sponsored study described CogWar as the ’weaponization of the brain sciences’ and contended that advances in CogWar will offer our adversaries ’a means of bypassing the traditional battlefield with significant strategic advantage, which may be utilized to radically transform Western +  * “The evolution of Brain-Machine-Interfaces (BMI) presents opportunities for adversaries to seek news ways of hacking the human brain.” (p. 1-7) 
-societies.’ ” (p. 6-1) +  * “A recent NATO-sponsored study described CogWar as the ’weaponization of the brain sciences’ and contended that advances in CogWar will offer our adversaries ’a means of bypassing the traditional battlefield with significant strategic advantage, which may be utilized to radically transform Western 
-– “The concept for a sixth domain of operations emerged at the beginning of 2020. It was introduced as the first recommendation in the essay ’Weaponization of neurosciences’ (Le Guyader, 2000) written for the ’Warfighting 2040’ study ran by Allied Command Transformation (ACT).” (p. 3-1) +  * societies.’ ” (p. 6-1) 
-– “Cognitive warfare is therefore the art of deceiving the brain or making it doubt what it thinks it knows.” (p. 4-15)+  * “The concept for a sixth domain of operations emerged at the beginning of 2020. It was introduced as the first recommendation in the essay ’Weaponization of neurosciences’ (Le Guyader, 2000) written for the ’Warfighting 2040’ study ran by Allied Command Transformation (ACT).” (p. 3-1) 
 +  * “Cognitive warfare is therefore the art of deceiving the brain or making it doubt what it thinks it knows.” (p. 4-15)
  
 ===== 13.2 NATO Disclosure Timelines for Emerging Weapon Technologies ===== ===== 13.2 NATO Disclosure Timelines for Emerging Weapon Technologies =====
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 **Phase 1: Technology Emergence and Classified Development (0–5 years)** **Phase 1: Technology Emergence and Classified Development (0–5 years)**
 +
 New capabilities typically begin in commercial or academic research settings before being recognized as dual-use technologies with military potential. At this point, NATO member states or affiliated bodies may sponsor classified research and prototyping efforts. For example, U.S. or EU defense innovation programs often act as the incubators for what will later become NATO-relevant capabilities. During this phase, which usually lasts up to five years after laboratory maturity, there is virtually no public reference to the work, even if small-scale operational testing is underway. New capabilities typically begin in commercial or academic research settings before being recognized as dual-use technologies with military potential. At this point, NATO member states or affiliated bodies may sponsor classified research and prototyping efforts. For example, U.S. or EU defense innovation programs often act as the incubators for what will later become NATO-relevant capabilities. During this phase, which usually lasts up to five years after laboratory maturity, there is virtually no public reference to the work, even if small-scale operational testing is underway.
  
 **Phase 2: Doctrinal Lag and Indirect References (4–7 years)** **Phase 2: Doctrinal Lag and Indirect References (4–7 years)**
 +
 Once technologies demonstrate operational promise, NATO gradually integrates them into doctrine, strategy, or summit language. Public references at this stage are often vague, couched in terms of “emerging threats” or “hybrid warfare,” without naming the precise capability. Historical precedents include stealth technology, which was flown in the late 1970s and fielded in the early 1980s but did not appear explicitly in NATO discourse until much later, and cyber warfare, which was operationally developed in the 1990s but formally recognized as a warfare domain only in 2016. Cognitive warfare follows this pattern: early internal discussions appear to date to the mid-2010s, yet the first formal NATO Innovation Hub paper was not released until late 2020. These cases suggest an average lag of four to six years between operational maturity and initial doctrinal framing. Once technologies demonstrate operational promise, NATO gradually integrates them into doctrine, strategy, or summit language. Public references at this stage are often vague, couched in terms of “emerging threats” or “hybrid warfare,” without naming the precise capability. Historical precedents include stealth technology, which was flown in the late 1970s and fielded in the early 1980s but did not appear explicitly in NATO discourse until much later, and cyber warfare, which was operationally developed in the 1990s but formally recognized as a warfare domain only in 2016. Cognitive warfare follows this pattern: early internal discussions appear to date to the mid-2010s, yet the first formal NATO Innovation Hub paper was not released until late 2020. These cases suggest an average lag of four to six years between operational maturity and initial doctrinal framing.
  
 **Phase 3: Public Framing and Capability Normalization (7–12 years)** **Phase 3: Public Framing and Capability Normalization (7–12 years)**
 +
 Once a technology is assumed to be well understood by adversaries—whether through intelligence leaks, observable deployment, or counter-use—NATO moves toward explicit public acknowledgment. This involves white papers, defense college studies, symposium proceedings, and eventually summit communiqu´es that situate the technology within the Alliance’s strategic concept. At this stage, capabilities are no longer considered highly secret but instead part of the broader competitive landscape. The normalization of cyber as a warfare domain and the integration of cognitive warfare into NATO strategy after 2020 illustrate this progression. Once a technology is assumed to be well understood by adversaries—whether through intelligence leaks, observable deployment, or counter-use—NATO moves toward explicit public acknowledgment. This involves white papers, defense college studies, symposium proceedings, and eventually summit communiqu´es that situate the technology within the Alliance’s strategic concept. At this stage, capabilities are no longer considered highly secret but instead part of the broader competitive landscape. The normalization of cyber as a warfare domain and the integration of cognitive warfare into NATO strategy after 2020 illustrate this progression.
  
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 The statistical findings identify three breakpoints: The statistical findings identify three breakpoints:
 +
   - Early 2016: Surge potentially driven by hypothetical neuroweapon deployment, with election polarization as a secondary factor (Relp et al., 2018; Dimock et al., 2014).   - Early 2016: Surge potentially driven by hypothetical neuroweapon deployment, with election polarization as a secondary factor (Relp et al., 2018; Dimock et al., 2014).
   - Early 2017: Correction, reflecting stabilization post-election or neuroweapon adaptation.   - Early 2017: Correction, reflecting stabilization post-election or neuroweapon adaptation.
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 ====== 14.1 The Challenge of Epistemological Obfuscation ====== ====== 14.1 The Challenge of Epistemological Obfuscation ======
  
-The most significant constraint on the neuroweapon hypothesis is the lack of traditional +The most significant constraint on the neuroweapon hypothesis is the lack of traditional epidemiological evidence, a point widely acknowledged in the literature. However, we argue that this deficit in proof is not evidence of absence, but rather a direct function of the technology’s presumed design and its strategic deployment within the context of cognitive warfare.
-epidemiological evidence, a point widely acknowledged in the literature (? ? ). However, +
-we argue that this deficit in proof is not evidence of absence, but rather a direct function +
-of the technology’s presumed design and its strategic deployment within the context of +
-cognitive warfare.+
  
 **Mimicry as Plausible Deniability** **Mimicry as Plausible Deniability**
 +
 The hypothetical deployment model posits a weapon system specifically engineered to induce a suite of non-specific, difficult- to-diagnose symptoms that perfectly mimic established clinical conditions. The hypothetical deployment model posits a weapon system specifically engineered to induce a suite of non-specific, difficult- to-diagnose symptoms that perfectly mimic established clinical conditions.
  
 **Overlap with Established Conditions** **Overlap with Established Conditions**
 +
 The observed search terms, which drive the structural breaks in the data, are highly compatible with the symptomatic profiles of: The observed search terms, which drive the structural breaks in the data, are highly compatible with the symptomatic profiles of:
 +
   - Psychotic Disorders: Symptoms like auditory hallucinations and paranoia, central to schizophrenia and psychosis (? ? ).   - Psychotic Disorders: Symptoms like auditory hallucinations and paranoia, central to schizophrenia and psychosis (? ? ).
   - Somatoform Disorders: Chronic physical complaints such as tinnitus, headache, and persistent fatigue, which overlap with conditions like fibromyalgia or chronic fatigue syndrome.   - Somatoform Disorders: Chronic physical complaints such as tinnitus, headache, and persistent fatigue, which overlap with conditions like fibromyalgia or chronic fatigue syndrome.
  
 **Consequence for Surveillance** **Consequence for Surveillance**
 +
 This intentional symptomatic compatibility serves as a powerful mechanism of epistemological obfuscation. By generating symptoms that map directly onto common mental and physical health diagnoses, the effect is statistically relegated to background noise, preventing the collection of clear, non-contaminated epidemiological data necessary for definitive proof. This intentional symptomatic compatibility serves as a powerful mechanism of epistemological obfuscation. By generating symptoms that map directly onto common mental and physical health diagnoses, the effect is statistically relegated to background noise, preventing the collection of clear, non-contaminated epidemiological data necessary for definitive proof.
  
 **The Cognitive Warfare Lens** **The Cognitive Warfare Lens**
 +
 Therefore, the circumstantial evidence of temporal alignment (the 2016 breakpoint coinciding with early Havana Syndrome reports) and symptomatic alignment (the surge in searches for these mimicked symptoms) must be considered the only detectable signal of a technology whose primary operational goal is not immediate lethality, but plausible deniability and population-level anxiety induction. Therefore, the circumstantial evidence of temporal alignment (the 2016 breakpoint coinciding with early Havana Syndrome reports) and symptomatic alignment (the surge in searches for these mimicked symptoms) must be considered the only detectable signal of a technology whose primary operational goal is not immediate lethality, but plausible deniability and population-level anxiety induction.
  
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 Support for this interpretation is threefold: Support for this interpretation is threefold:
 +
   - Cross-platform concordance between Google and Reddit data, both reflecting distinct individuals, rules out per-user amplification artifacts.   - Cross-platform concordance between Google and Reddit data, both reflecting distinct individuals, rules out per-user amplification artifacts.
   - Temporal alignment with early Havana Syndrome reports suggests that 2016 marked not just a statistical anomaly but the onset of a new class of exposure.   - Temporal alignment with early Havana Syndrome reports suggests that 2016 marked not just a statistical anomaly but the onset of a new class of exposure.
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